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Abstract – It is well-known that criminals have many 
ways of illegally accessing ATM machines to access the 
account of legitimate users.  In this paper, we briefly 
provide an overview of the possible fraudulent activities 
that may be perpetrated against ATMs and justify why 
the use of biometric should be considered as preventive 
measure. A prototype of biometric ATM was designed 
and questionnaires were distributed to users for their 
opinion. Finally, the paper concludes by giving a simple 
risk and cost benefit analysis for the proposed design. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An automated teller machine was first introduced in 
1960 by City Bank of New York on a trial basis, the 
concept of this machine was for customers to pay utility 
bills and get a receipt without a teller [1]. It allows financial 
institutions to provide their customers with a convenient 
way, round the clock, to carry out varying transactions 
which included withdrawal of funds, made deposits, check 
account balance, and later on included features to allow 
customers pay bills, etc. ATMs are not only located at 
banks but also increasing numbers of businesses, especially 
retailers for both customer convenience and a new revenue 
stream. A global ATM market forecast research conducted 
by Retail Banking Research Limited [2] shows that there 
are 1.8 million ATMs deployed around the world today and 
the figure is forecast to reach 2.5 million by 2013.  
Authentication methods for ATM cards have little 
changed since their introduction in the 1960‟s. Typically, 
the authentication design involves a trusted hardware 
device (ATM card or token). The card holder‟s Personal 
Identification Number (PIN) is usually the only means to 
verify the identity of the user. However, due to the 
limitations of such design, an intruder in possession of a 
user‟s device can discover the user‟s PIN with brute force 
attack. For instance, in a typical four digits PIN, one in 
every 10,000 users will have the same number. The 
security limitations of ATM are mostly derived from the 
security pitfalls of the magnetic media. The data in the 
magnetic stripe is usually coded using two or three tracks. 
The standard covering this area is ISO 7811. The technique 
for writing to the tracks is known as F/2F. The reason is 
that it is not that difficult and/or expensive to have the 
equipment to encode magnetic stripes. Fortunately, 
magnetic stripe weakness has been partly addressed by the 
introduction of EMV smartcards.  Despite security 
measures, cases of ATM crimes continue to occur globally. 
Incidents have been reported in Asia-Pacific, the Americas, 
Africa, Russia and the Middle East. Some examples include 
are reported in {[3], [4] and [5]}. This paper is organized as 
follows: the next section briefly discusses different security 
breaches in ATM system. Section three explained the 
proposal design. Finally, section four concludes the paper.   
 
II. TYPES OF ATM FRAUDS 
In the last few years, there have been many reports of 
hacking into the electronic ATM system and caused billion 
dollars of losses in the banking company itself. Oracle 
attack on authentication protocols and breaches affecting 
the ATM machine such as cloning of cards and hacking of 
PIN code have been reported increasingly. Some popular 
ATM frauds/attacks are explained below in the following 
subsection.  
 
A. Skimming Attack 
This is the most popular breach in ATM transaction. 
In this ingenious rip-off, lawbreakers are taking advantage 
of technology to make counterfeit ATM cards by using a 
skimmer (a card swipe device that reads the information on 
ATM card). These devices resemble a hand-held credit card 
scanner and are often fastened in close proximity to or over 
top of an ATM‟s factory-installed card reader. When 
removed from the ATM, a skimmer allows the download of 
personal data belonging to everyone who used it to swipe an 
ATM card. A single skimmer can retain information from 
than 200 ATM cards before being re-used.  
 
B. Card trapping  
This involves placing a device directly over or into the 
ATM card reader slot. In this case, a card is physically 
captured by the trapping device inside the ATM and the 
fraudster tries any method to capture the customer„s PIN. 
When the customer leaves the ATM without their card, the 
card is retrieved by the thieves. Typically only one card is 
lost in each attack. The criminals have to withdraw the 
whole device each time a card is trapped, although recently 
a card trapping device has been seen that can stay in place 
for a period of time and that allows removal of trapped 
cards without the removal of the device. The most common 
variant is known as the Lebanese Loop.  
 
C. PIN Cracking 
Attacks on customers‟ PINs have been known to 
security researchers for years, e.g., [6], [7], [8]. One of the 
most efficient of these „PIN cracking‟ attacks are due to 
Berkman and Ostrovsky [9]. It explained how the 
processing system used by banks is open to abuse. One of 
the attacks targets the translate function in switches - an 
abuse functions that are used to allow customers to select 
their PINs online. In either case, the flaws create a means 
for an attacker to discover PIN codes, for example, those 
entered by customers while withdrawing cash from an 
ATM providing they have access to the online PIN 
verification facility or switching processes. A bank insider 
could use an existing Hardware Security Module (HSM) to 





reveal the encrypted PIN codes.  Even worse, an insider of 
a third-party Switching provider could attack a bank 
outside of his territory or even in another continent. 
Unfortunately, proposals to counter such attacks are almost 
non-existent other than a few suggestions; for example, 
maintaining the secrecy (and integrity) of some data 
elements related to PIN processing (that are considered 
security insensitive according to current banking standards) 
such as the „decimalization table‟ and „PIN Verification 
Values (PVVs)/Offsets‟ has been emphasized [7], [9]. 
 
D. Phishing/Vishing Attack 
Phishing scams are designed to entice the user to 
provide the card number and PIN for their bank card. 
Typically, an attacker uses email representing them as a 
bank and claiming that user account information is 
incomplete, or that the user needs to update their account 
information to prevent the account from being closed. The 
user is asked to click on a link and follow the directions 
provided. The link however is fraudulent and directs the 
user to a site set up by the attacker and designed to look 
like the user„s bank. The site directs the user to input 
sensitive information such as card numbers and PINs. The 
information is collected by the thieves and used to create 
fraudulent cards. Some variants are spear phishing and 
Rock Phish attacks.  
Traditionally, after a successful phishing attack, the 
criminal would extract the needed information and go onto 
the online account and remove the victim's bank funds. 
This has changed for some of the more sophisticated 
criminals in recent years were instead of looting the 
victim's account; they go to the check image page, where 
they take a copy of the victim's check. Many financial 
institutions are now offering check images as part of their 
online banking services to their customers. The checks 
contain the victim's bank account number, signature, 
address, phone etc. The attacker can either take the copy 
and make paper counterfeit checks, or take that information 
and create PayPal accounts or other online payment 
accounts.  
 
E. ATM Malware  
Malware attacks required an insider, such as an ATM 
technician who has a key to the machine, to place the 
malware on the ATM. Once that was done, the attackers 
could insert a control card into the machine‟s card reader to 
trigger the malware and give them control of the machine 
through a custom interface and the ATM‟s keypad. 
According to a report in [10] found a Trojan family of 
malware that infected 20 ATMs in Eastern Europe. The 
malware lets criminals take over the ATM to steal data, 
PINs and cash. The malware captures magnetic stripe data 
and PIN codes from the private memory space of 
transaction-processing applications installed on a 
compromised ATM.  
 
F. ATM hacking  
Attackers use sophisticated programming techniques 
to break into websites which reside on a financial 
institution's network. Using this access, they can access the 
bank's systems to locate the ATM database and hence 
collect card information which can be used later to create a 
clone card. Hacking is also commonly used to describe 
attacks against card processors and other components of the 
transaction processing network. Most of the ATM hackings 
are due to the use of non-secure ATM software.  
 
III. SECURITY MEASURES  
As technology advances, as ATM applications become 
more ubiquitous, as more confidential data is transmitted 
over the ATM system, as more sensitive transactions are 
conducted, as more threats breaches are reported, the 
challenge of securing the system becomes more urgent. 
Many security services in bank transactions are dependent 
on authenticating users such as generation of accurate audit 
trails, non-repudiation in communications, preserving 
confidentiality and other input validation techniques such 
as batch totals, format checks, reasonableness checks, and 
transaction validation. These features only ensure that 
certain procedures are followed, and cannot tell whether the 
person with the card and PIN is authorized to use it, they 
just ensure that the data transmitted follows certain 
guidelines or protocols that requests such as cash 
withdrawals are made within reasonable limits, that money 
is transferred to the proper account, and so forth. Therefore, 
it is essential to develop stronger authentication and 
identification measures to stop criminals from committing 
fraudulent act. One of best security measures against some 
of the attacks mentioned above is the deployment of 
biometric in the current ATM system as discussed below. 
 
Biometric Smartcard – A prototype 
Biometric identification is utilized to verify a person‟s 
identity by measuring digitally certain human 
characteristics and comparing those measurements with 
those that have been stored in a template for that same 
person. Templates can be stored at the biometric device, the 
institution‟s database, a user‟s smart card, or a Trusted 
Third Party service provider‟s database. There are two 
major categories of biometric techniques: physiological 
(fingerprint verification, iris analysis, hand geometry-vein 
patterns, ear recognition, odor detection, DNA pattern 
analysis and sweat pores analysis), and behavioral 
(handwritten signature verification, keystroke analysis and 
speech analysis). In [11], it was found that behavior based 
systems were perceived as less acceptable than those based 
on physiological characteristics. Of the physiological 
techniques, the most commonly utilized is that of 
fingerprint scanning. With biometrics, such fraudulent 
incidents can be minimized, as an added layer of 
authentication is now introduced that ensures that even with 
the correct pin information and in possession of another 
person's ATM card, the user‟s biometric features cannot 
easily be faked. The advantages of this may include: all 
attributes of the ATM cards will be maintained, 
counterfeiting attempts are reduced due to enrolment 
process that verifies identity and captures biometrics, and it 
will be extremely high secure and excellent user-to-card 
authentication. These advantages are for the benefit of 
users as well as system administrators because the 
problems and costs associated with lost, reissued or 
temporarily issued can be avoided, thus saving some costs 
of the system management.  





On the negative side, the major risk posed by the use 
of biometric systems is that a malicious subject may 
interfere with the communication and intercept the 
biometric template and use it later to obtain access [12]. 
Likewise, an attack may be committed by generating a 
template from a fingerprint obtained from some surface. 
Although few biometric systems are fast and accurate in 
terms of low false acceptance rate enough to allow 
identification (automatically recognizing the user identity), 
most of current systems are suitable for the verification 
only, as the false acceptance rate is too high.  
 
The propose design uses a maximum of 8 characters, 
numbers or mix of the both PIN and fingerprint as 
verification factors of the authentication process. ACOS 
smartcards and AET60 BioCARDKey development kit 
were used in the propose design.  In the verification part, 
the users have to submit the correct PIN DES encrypted 
current session key to get access to the next level. Users 
have 3 successful attempts to enter the correct PIN, else the 
cards will be locked and render it to useless. Lastly, we use 
the fingerprint as the biometric identifiers as it takes 
shortest enrollment time. The proposed design involves two 
phases namely enrollment phase and verification phase. 
Each of the phases is briefly describe below. 
 
Enrollment - Prior to an individual being identified or 
verified by a biometric device, the enrollment process must 
be completed. The objective of this enrollment process is to 
create a profile of the user. The process consists of the 
following two steps: 
1. Sample Capture: the user allows for a minimum 
of two or three biometric readings, for example: 
placing a finger in a fingerprint reader. The 
quality of the samples, together with the number 
of samples taken, will influence the level of 
accuracy at the time of validation. Not all 
samples are stored; the technology analyzes and 
measures various data points unique to each 
individual. The number of measured data points 
varies in accordance to the type of device. 
2. Conversion and Encryption: the individual‟s 
measurements and data points are converted to a 
mathematical algorithm and encrypted. These 
algorithms are extremely complex and cannot be 
reversed engineered to obtain the original image. 
The algorithm may then be stored as a user‟s 
template in a number of places including servers 
and ATM card. 
 
A new and blank ATM card has to be enrolled 
with user details before it can be verified later. Enrollment 
system is usually operated by the admin to enter their 
customer details into the card. However, exception applies 
to the PIN entry where it should be entered by the user 
themselves and need to enter the PIN again to make sure 

























Figure 1: Flowchart for the Enrollment Process  
 
 
Figure 2: Enrollment Process 
 
Identification and Verification - Once the individual 
has been enrolled in a system, he/she can start to use 
biometric technology to have access to his account via the 
ATM machine or related system to authorize transactions.  
1. Identification: a one-to-many match. The user 
provides a biometric sample and the system looks 
at all user templates in the database. If there is a 
match, the user is granted access, otherwise, it is 
declined. 
2. Verification: a one-to-one match requiring the 
user provides identification such as a PIN and 
valid ATM card in addition to the biometric 
sample. In other words, the user is establishing 
who he/she is and the system simply verifies if 
this is correct. The biometric sample with the 





provided identification is compared to the 
previously stored information in the database. If 







































Figure 3: Flowchart for the Verification Process 
 
 
         Figure 4: Verification Process 
 
After the card has been enrolled with user data, 
this particular card will be the user‟s ID. The PIN and 
fingerprint sample from the user were also encrypted and 
save into the card. In order to get access into the ATM 
machine, the user has to present the card to the card reader, 
and then verify the PIN and lastly matched their fingerprint 
detail with the card.   In this particular system, the ATM 
interface is quite a simple one just showing the simple debit 
and credit function, what we tried to emphasis in our 
project is the complex verification part which includes the 
MAC and PIN encryption. 
 
Customers’ Perception 
 To understand the customer‟s perception, a 
simple research was conducted in Saudi Arabia. It is 
interesting that 56% of the users are convenient with the 
traditional ATM system while only 44% were not. Overall, 
a significant number of customers 68% were not aware 
about ATM frauds. When asked about the proposed design, 
42% said they will be interested while 58% shows no 
interest. 63% said they would respond better if they knew 
much about ATM fraud and counter measures. 
 
 
Figure 5. Customers‟ Responses  
 
IV. RISK ASSESSMENT 
Despite the fact that more than half of the users 
involved in the survey are in favor of the traditional method 
(i.e. PIN and Card only), it is important for the banks to 
perform some risk analysis and decide whether to introduce 
the biometric scheme in the ATM system or not.  In 
general, risks are assessed by evaluating preferences, 
estimating consequences of undesirable events, predicting 
the likelihood of such events, and weighing the merits of 
different courses of action. In this context, risk is formally 
defined as a set of ordered pairs of outcomes (O) and their 
associated likelihoods of occurrence. 
 
Quantitative Risk Analysis Calculations 
The key variables and equations used for conducting a 
quantitative risk analysis are shown below:  
First, we need to determine the probability of loss 
caused by identified threat. This is known as the exposure 
value (EV). The value ranges from 0% to 100%. 
Second, we need to determine a potential 
monetary loss factor for a single incident. This is known as 
the single loss expectancy (SLE). 
  
Single Loss Expectancy (SLE) = Asset Value x Exposure 
Value. For instance, if the asset value is $1,000,000 and the 
probability of EV is 0.2, then; 
 
SLE = 1,000,000 x 20% likelihood = $200,000 
 
Third, we need to determine the annualized rate 
of occurrence (ARO). This is the estimated frequency a 





threat will occur within a year and is characterized on an 
annual basis. A threat occurring once in 10 years has an 
ARO of 0.1; a threat occurring 10 times in a year has an 
ARO of 10.  
 Finally, we need to determine how many times 
we could expect this loss to occur over a full year. This is 
known as the annualized loss expectancy (ALE). The 
formula to calculate ALE then is SLE x ARO. The 




{O1 …….On} = Set of harmful outcomes 
I(Ok)               = Impact of outcomes k in currency 
 Fk                   = Frequency of outcomes k 
 
Assuming that based on the current system, ATM 
violations occur 10 times per year, then ALE is shown to 
be; 
$200,000 x 10 = $2,000,000 ALE 
 
The safeguard cost/benefit analysis or simply cost 
benefit analysis (CBA) = (ALE before implementing 
safeguard) – (ALE after implementing safeguard) – (annual 
cost of safeguard) = value of safeguard to the company. 
 
Assuming that based on the proposed biometric ATM 
system, violations occur 1 times in 10 years; then ALE is 
shown to be; 
$200,000 x 0.1 = $20,000 ALE 
 
If the annual cost of the biometric security 
solution/safeguard is $10,000, then  
 
 CBA = $2,000,000 – ($20,000 +$10,000) = $1,970,000 
 
Therefore, the bank stands to save, or avoid, over 
$2 million per year in potential losses by enforcing the 
biometric solution. Though, this does not mean that the 
bank will have $2 million as a profit line in the revenue 
report. However, it clearly makes sense to spend the 
$10,000 to avoid the potential $2 million annual loss. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Automatic Teller Machines have become a 
mature technology which provides financial services to an 
increasing segment of the population in many countries. 
Biometrics, and in particular fingerprint scanning, 
continues to gain acceptance as a reliable form of securing 
access through identification and verification processes. 
This paper identifies a high-level model for the 
modification of existing ATM systems to economically 
incorporate fingerprint scanning; and, outlines the 
advantages of using such system. It should be noted that the 
customers‟ perception cannot be generalized as it was 
highly affected by the tradition/culture of the users 
involves. It is a common practice in Saudi Arabia for some 
to assign his/her relative to perform ATM transactions such 
as bill payments, withdrawal and depositing on his/her 
behalf. In such case, biometric system will not be favored. 
As can also be seen from the statistic, there is lack of fraud 
awareness among the majority of the customers, it is 
therefore vital to ensure customers are aware about ATM 
fraud and preventive measures. Alternatively, the banks 
may also consider the biometric system as optional for 
those who are interested. 
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